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This paper studies pre-marital parental investments in their chil-
dren's wealth where spousal wealth is a public good in marriage. By
investing in their children's wealth, parents increase the wealth of their
children and the quality of the spouses that their children can marry.
In large marriage markets, the hedonic return to investment internal-
izes all the external benets of pre-marital investment in wealth so
that the competitive equilibrium is ecient. Marriage market compe-
tition also increases investments in small marriage markets relative to
no competition, but equilibrium investments are not ecient.
1 Introduction
In marriage, an individual derives utility from own pre-marital investment
and the pre-marital invesment of his or her spouse. Much of these investments
are human capital investments made by altruistic parents. Since pre-marital
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1investment is a public good in marriage, parents may under invest in their
children.1
This literature typically assumes that the child's marriage partner is xed
and independent of any investment that the family makes in the child. In
this sense the arguments leave out the important eects that competition
for spouses will have on ex ante investment incentives. In this paper, we
study pre-marital investments when children use these investments to com-
pete for spouses. We are primarily interested in the implications of assorta-
tive matching equilibria which occur when wealthy individuals are matched
with wealthy partners. Then altruistic parents take into account the addi-
tional utility their children will enjoy from wealthier partners, and this will
increase their incentive to invest in their children on the margin.
Our rst model considers the case where the number of families is very
large. We study a competitive equilibrium in which all families on the same
side of the market believe that they face the same non-stochastic return to
their investment in their children. This return function adjusts until families
beliefs are fullled in equilibrium.
Perhaps the most remarkable property of investment in the competitive
equilibrium is the fact that the externalities associated with families' invest-
ments in their children are completely internalized by this return function.
Any pair of families whose children match on the competitive equilibrium
path, will make investments that are bilaterally pareto optimal. Despite the
fact that neither family can directly compensate the other family for the
investment that it makes in its child, the marriage market and the assorta-
tive matching that occurs there forces each family to compensate the other
indirectly through the investment that it makes in its own child.
This eciency result is an application of Rosen's hedonic pricing approach
to large matching problems (Rosen (1974)). The market return function
provides what is essentially a hedonic value for every investment level that
a family might consider making. Families on the other side of the market
need to provide these hedonic values in order to attract partners with specic
investment levels. In equilibrium, each family's indierence curve (in the
1For a discussion of the incentive for private provision of public goods see Bergstom,
Blume and Varian (1986) and references cited therein. More specically, MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993) explore investment incentives in bilateral matching problem, and in
particular discuss the impact of outside options on these incentives. For a discussion
of investment incentives in marriage with outside options but without marriage market
competition, see Konrad and Lommerud (2000).
2space of investments) will be tangent to this hedonic return function, and
consequently, families whose children match will have indierence curves that
are tangent to each other. The investments that families undertake will then
be bilaterally ecient in the sense that there will not be another pair of
investments that will make both of the matched families better o at the
same time. Since the joint payos that we employ are supermodular (Becker
(1973),Smith (1996)) assortative matching along with bilateral eciency are
sucient to guarantee that the distribution of investments for the economy
is ecient.
Matters are more complicated in small marriage markets. When the
number of families and children is small, assortative matching among children
will raise families incentive to invest and at the same time make families
investments less predictable. If there are signicant wealth disparities on
the other side of the market, parents may nd that they can increase the
wealth of their child's partner signicantly by raising their investment only
slightly. This makes parental payo functions discontinuous, which rules out
pure strategy equilibria in some situations. In the mixed strategy equilibria
that do prevail, parental investment is stochastic. Though rich families will
invest more in their children on average than poor families do, there will
be a positive probability that the poor families will invest more than rich
families so that their children move up the wealth distribution. This creates
endogenous intergenerational mobility.
The small numbers case is perhaps not so interesting in the context of
the family matching problem in which large market arguments seem quite
natural. However, our methods apply to a variety other bilateral matching
markets where small numbers are more important. For example workers and
rms face a similar diculty with ex ante investments in physical and human
capital, even though a wider variety of contractual remedies for holdup prob-
lems are available in that context. Some problems where small numbers are
likely to be more important are co-authorship in academics, sports teams,
business partnerships or other forms of collaborative activity.2 We have not
been able to provide a complete link between the small and large numbers
case, but we can give complete characterization of equilibrium for a special
case which illustrates most of the issues involved.
Ex ante investments in labor markets have been analyzed in a couple
of papers. In an interesting paper, Shi (1997) allows rms to choose which
2These examples were suggested by a referee.
3of several market segments to join and then to pick a capital investment
optimal for the workers who are available in that segment. Since the workers
human capital endowments are exogenous, and matching is random within
a segment, his results are not easy to compare with ours. The primary
dierence is that workers and rms cannot move across market segments
once their investments have been made, so workers do not compete against
one another for partners and the matching return to investment that we
describe does not arise.
Closer to our treatment is a paper by Felli and Roberts (2000) in which
workers oer to work for rms at wages that depend on their human capital
investments. Each worker oers a wage that makes its target rm just
indierent between accepting the oer and accepting the oer of the next
most skilled worker. The logic of their equilibrium is reminiscent of the logic
used to show that bidders bid their true valuations in second price auctions.
The prot a worker needs to oer a rm is determined by the human capital
investment of a worker that the rm does not hire on the equilibrium path.
The worker that the rm does hire gets all the residual, and so has the
correct ex ante investment incentives. Their procedure diers from ours in
two ways. First, utility is transferable and the return to investment is
a monetary payment that the worker extracts from the rm instead of a
matching return. Though their procedure resolves the holdup problem for
workers, it does not achieve full eciency since rms investment incentives
are not inecient.
The closest work to ours is Cole, Malaith and Postlewaite (1998) and Cole,
Malaith and Postlewaite (2000). They consider a family matching problem
with transfers in which investments are followed by a cooperative matching
process that selects partners and redistributes income across children. They
show that ecient investments can be supported as an equilibrium outcome,
though other inecient equilibria are also possible. Ecient investments
occur because the cooperative matching process generates an explicit mon-
etary return to investment. In our model there is no monetary return to
investment, and marginal incentives are created solely by the expectation
that higher investment will improve match quality.
Han (2001) extends the worker rm investment matching model to en-
vironments where traders disagree about who the most desirable partners
are. In addition, he provides a survey and comparison of the equilibrium
outcomes of the papers listed above.
Siow and Zhu (1998) also study a large marriage market and pre-marital
4investment problem with transferable utility and two wealth classes on each
side of the market. They also study multigenerational equilibria. Ace-
moglu (1997) studies a two side matching investment model with workers
and rms. He obtains underinvestment because due to potential random
matching, workers and rms are unable to fully capture the returns to their
pre-employment investments.
While this paper focuses on the marriage market, our analysis applies to
other partnerships in which the share of surplus in the partnership is not
conditioned on the level of pre-partnership investment. Members of ama-
teur sports teams and co-authors in economics usually do not divide surplus
according to their levels of pre-partnership investments. In most of these
markets, agents invest in pre-partnership human capital and then compete
for partners. The results in this paper should be useful for thinking about
those markets as well.
2 Preliminaries
Families begin with an endowment of wealth y which can be used partly
as current consumption, and partly as an investment in children. Let w be
the amount invested in the child. If the child subsequently matches with a
partner whose wealth level is e w then utility for the parents is given by
V (y   w) + z  (w + e w) ; z > 0
and utility of the child is
z  (w + e w)
If the family invests w and the child is not expected to match, then we assume
that the child has utility zw. The actual value of the childrens' utility when
no match occurs is unimportant as long as both the child and family are at
least weakly better o when a match occurs than if it doesn't.3
Assumption The function V () is monotonically increasing, strictly con-
cave, dierentiable, has bounded marginal utilities and satises
lim
x!0V (x) =  1
3It is possible that children might strictly prefer not to match if the best available part-
ner is too poor. This creates problems for our methodology, but these are not particularly
relevant for the issues we wish to discuss.
5The bilateral Nash, or non-competitive investment levels for each family
are given by the solutions to
V
0 (yi   w

i) = z (1)
These are the investment levels that the families would make if they believed
(for whatever reason) that their children's match partner is independent of
parental investment. In the case where there are only two families, one
on each side of the market, the investment of the family on the other side
of the market would be xed and equilibrium investment would satisfy 1.
Investment would be inecient in this case because 1 does not take account
of the positive eect that the family's investment has on the family on the
other side of the market.
After the families have made their investments, the children compete for
partners in the marriage market. We will rst study the investment and
matching problem in a large marriage market. Then we will investigate
properties of small marriage markets.
3 Large Marriage Markets
This section considers a large marriage market with a continuum of families
on each side of the market. We refer to families with female children as
families `in F' and similarly, families with male children are families `in M'.
Let the total measure of female families be F and the total measure of male
families be M where F  M. Let G and H be measures of sets of families
in M and F respectively. Interpret G(B) to be the measure of the set of
families whose endowments lie in the set B and similarly for H. Suppose
that the wealth levels of families in M are distributed on a closed interval Y ,
while families in F have their wealth distributed on a closed interval ~ Y .
Let g (w) represent the wealth of the wife that each family in M expects
to match with from an investment of w in their son. If families expectations
are realized, then g 1(e w) will represent the wealth of the groom that each
family in F expects to match with from an investment of e w in their daughter.
Since higher wealth attracts better partners with assortative matching, g(w)
will be non-decreasing in w.
Denition 1 The return function g (w) is a rational expectations equilib-
rium if there exist investment strategies  (y) and ~  (~ y) for families in M and
F respectively such that
61.  (y) 2 argmaxx fV (y   x) + z(x + g (x))g for each y 2 Y and ~  (~ y) 2
argmaxx fV (e y   x) + z(x + g 1 (x))g for each ~ y 2 ~ Y ;
2. for each w; Gfy :  (y)  wg = H f~ y : ~  (~ y)  g (w)g:
(1) in the denition above says that each family optimally chooses a
wealth level for their child given the return function g(w). (2) is the marriage
market clearing condition. It requires that the measure of the set of families
in M who (optimally) invest w or more is exactly equal to the measure of
the set of families in F who invest g (w) or more. By assortative matching,
this means that every family in M who invests w or more will be able to nd
a partner for their child whose investment is g (w) or more.
Figure 1 illustrates a rational expectations equilibrium. The investment
levels for families in M are given along the horizontal axis, while investments
for families in F are along the vertical axis. The dark curve illustrates the
equilibrium matching function. The lighter curves that are convex upward
are indierence curves for families in M, those that are convex downward are
indierence curves for families in F. A family in M who invests w should
expect their child to match with someone whose wealth is g (w). In equilib-
rium, if a family chooses investment w then their indierence curve should
be tangent to the curve g (w) at the point (w;g (w)). The reason is that
the family thinks that g (w) represents the market return function that they
face. Similarly, any family in F who chooses to invest g (w) should expect
return w. In equilibrium this family must have an indierence curve tan-
gent to the market trade-o function g 1 () at the point (w;g (w)).This
implies that the indierence curves of the families of every pair of children
who match in equilibrium will be tangent to each other. So every pair of fam-
ilies who matches will choose investments that are bilaterally pareto optimal
- the under investment problem disappears.
As the picture is drawn, the family from M who attains the indierence
curve II is the one with the lowest endowment, while the family from F
who attains the indierence curve I0I0 touching the market return line at
point A is the family with the lowest endowment who actually succeeds in
matching. In equilibrium, this family will have to be just indierent between
making a positive investment and matching with the poorest family in M,
and investing Nash and having no partner at all. That is why the indierence
curve I0I0 just touches the vertical axis.
To see this more formally, focus on the case where both G and H are














Figure 1: Matching Function
8matching, a family in M with income y should end up matching with a family
from F whose income is (y) provided that each families investment is an
increasing function of its endowment. A necessary condition for optimality is
that a family from M whose income is y should prefer to invest  (y) than to
invest  (y0) as they would if their income were y0 instead of y. In equilibrium
with assortative matching, each family's payo can be written
V (y    (y)) + z( (y) + ~  ((y)))
This can be no smaller than V (y    (y0)) + z( (y0) + ~  ((y0))). So dier-
entiating this latter expression with respect to y0 and setting the resulting
derivative evaluated at y0 = y equal to zero gives the necessary condition

0 (y)[ V
0 (y    (y)) + z] =  z~ 
0 ((y))
0 (y) (2)







0 ((y)   ~  ((y))) + z] (3)
Dividing (2) by (3) gives equality of the marginal rates of substitution be-
tween own investment and partner wealth (i.e., tangency of the families in-
dierence curves in the Figure above).
This tangency condition means that there is no way that a pair of fami-
lies whose children match can jointly change their investments to make both
families better o. There remains only the possibility that families could be
rematched, then adjust their investments in a way that will make everyone
better o. The payo function we employ has a simple single crossing prop-
erty that rules this out. So an immediate consequence of bilateral eciency
is that
Proposition 2 A rational expectation equilibrium is pareto optimal.
Proof. We show that if families are rematched in a non-assortative fash-
ion, then at least one family must be made worse o than they are in the
rational expectations equilibrium. Figure 1 can be used to illustrate. Sup-
pose that a pareto improvement can be obtained by rematching in such a
way that family A in M (that is, the family who ends up at allocation A
in Figure 1) is rematched with family B from F. Family A is the family
in Figure 1 who chooses the point A while family B is the family from F
9who chooses the outcome B. If matching family B with family A results in
a pareto improvement, then investment levels need to be adjusted so that
both families end up on higher indierence curves than they attain in the
initial assortative matching equilibrium. Since family B chooses a higher
investment level that A0s original partner, family B must have higher wealth
than A's intial partner by assortative matching, so B's indierence curve will
be too steep to cross family A's indierence curve and a pareto improving
change in investment levels is impossible.
4 Existence of a Rational Expectations Equi-
librium
Our notion of rational expectations equilibrium can be applied no matter
what the properties of the underlying distributions G and H happen to be.
For example, G and H could consist of atoms or agglomerations of families
at specic wealth levels.4 When a rational expectations equilibrium exists it
will be pareto optimal as argued above. In some simple problems existence of
a rational expectations equilibrium is immediate. For example, suppose that
G = H. Then set g (w) = w. Then each family chooses the (ecient) level of
investment w that equates the marginal utility of consumption and 2. For
a variety of reasons, this is not a good example of the rational expectations
solution concept. We return to it momentarily.
A more illuminating example occurs when G and H dier. Suppose as
before that F > M but that all the families in F have the same endowment.
In gure 1, suppose that all families in F have indierence curves like I0I0.
Dene g (x) so that it coincides with I0I0. Let the families in M choose the
points on this indierence curve that they most desire. Families in F can then
choose investment levels to match with families in M along this indierence
curve. The market return function will have a closed form solution provided
that the indierence curve can be represented in closed form.
To avoid making the mechanics too complicated, we sketch the argument
for existence of equilibrium in the case where the distribution functions G and
4One particularly simple case to imagine is the one in which all families on the same
side of the market are identical. For example in Figure 1, all families in M could have
indierence curves given by II while all families in F have indierence curves given by
I0I0. The rational expectations return function drawn in that diagram would still work
and provide and ecient rational expectations equilibrium.
10H are both monotonic with dierentiable inverse functions whose derivatives
are bounded away from 0 and innity. Dene for each y in the support
of G,  (y) = fy0 2 suppH : F   H (y0) = M   G(y)g. Since G and H are
both monotonic and dierentiable, so is . Furthermore, the derivative of 
is bounded away from 0 and 1. The rst order condition for the optimal
investment for a family of income y is given by
 V
0 (y   w) + z(1 + g
0 (w)) = 0
Since V 0 is monotonic, it has an inverse. This implies that the income of the
family in M who invests w must be equal to
V
0 1 (z(1 + g
0 (w)) + w
The family in F who invests g (w) has an income level such that g (w) satises
 V
0 (y




In equilibrium, this family matches with the family in M who invests w.
If g () is a rational expectations solution, the measure of families who are
wealthier than this family from M must be equal to the measure of families
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Let (g0;w) denote the expression on the right hand side of this equation.
Since  is monotonically decreasing in g0 the inverse function  1 (;w) exists.
So the market return function must satisfy
g
0 (w) = 
 1 (g (w);w) (4)
11To see the initial condition, let y be the poorest family from F who suc-
cessfully matches with some family from M in equilibrium (y satises F  
H (y) = M). Let I be the highest indierence curve that the family with
endowment y can attain when they do not match. Let (w;g (w)) be the
point where this indierence curve is tangent to the indierence curve for a
family in M who endowment is y. The equilibrium market return function is
then any solution to (4) with initial condition (w;g (w)). To ensure existence
and uniqueness of the solution we need to impose additional restrictions on
the problem to ensure that  1 satises the usual Lipshitz condition in g.
We do not pursue these issues here.
5 A Hedonic Pricing Interpretation
The above model can be interpreted as a special case of Rosen's hedonic
market model. To see this most easily, consider families in M as suppliers.
Let y be the characteristic of a supplier. Let w be the level of output (pre-
marital investment) that a supplier produces. Note that w also provides
consumption value for the supplier and thus is not purely costly. g(w) is
the return that a son gets for supplying w. We may consider families in
F as demanders. If a demander pays e w, the daughter will match with a
supplier whose output is g 1(e w). Unlike Rosen, demanders value paying
e w. However this does not cause any analytic diculty because a demander,
that is matched, will pay a higher e w than she is willing to pay if she is not
matched. So as in the case of Rosen's rms, the demander will prefer to pay
less e w for her matched supplier if she could.
The existence of a market clearing wealth matching function g(w) is useful
for researchers who want to study parental investment decisions in the face of
marriage market considerations. For an individual family, g(w) summarizes
the marriage market opportunities that that family will face. For example,
Botticini and Siow (1999) assumes the existence of such a function to study
the demand for dowries by individual families.
6 Small Marriage Markets
We continue to assume without further discussion that children match as-
sortatively in investment during the matching process. It is not hard to
12construct non-cooperative matching games where this occurs. One approach
is to follow the approach associated with wage posting games (for example
Shi (1997)) in which one side publicly announce the wealth that they bring
to a match, the other side proposes to the partner they most prefer, then the
respondents pick their favorite partner among those who have proposed to
them. We do not pursue these details here.
It is also possible to show that the investment game among families that
occurs prior to this assortative matching process always has at least one
equilibrium which typically involves mixed strategies. The details of this
argument can be found in the working paper.
We focus instead on the richest example in which the equilibrium can be
fully characterized. Our point in doing this is twofold. First, this example
is of independent interest in matching problems like co-authorship, or busi-
ness partnership where the number of investors on each side of the market
really is small. Secondly, this example illustrates the diculties associated
with connecting the rational expecations solution with exact equilibria in the
family matching problem when the number of families is large but nite.
We consider the case where there are four families. One of the families
from F and one from M have an initial endowment yl while the other pair of







where, in an obvious notation the superscript f refers to children of families
from F while the superscript m refers to children of families in M. In the case





continuation equilibrium is straightforward. The wealthy child from F will
propose to the wealthy child from M with probability 1 and this proposal
will be accepted. Similarly for the less wealthy children. The poor F has no
incentive to propose to the wealthy M because she expects the wealthy F to
propose there with probability 1 and she knows that the wealthy male will
always prefer her proposal.
If the wealth disparity of the families is large enough, it will never pay
families to try to improve their children's match quality. In that case there
will be an obvious equilibrium where families make non-cooperative invest-


























13The assumption says that a poor family would be willing to raise invest-
ment to w
h if they believed that this would generate a match with a child
from a wealthy family making the non-cooperative investment.
Then we have:
Theorem 3 There exists a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which
the wealthy families both use mixture Hh while the poor families both use
mixture Hl. These mixtures have the following properties:
1. Hl has an atom at w
l and Hh has an atom at w




2. Hl and Hh both have smooth density functions on some interval [w
h;w]
with H0
l (s) < H0
h (s) for all s 2 [w
h;w]
The proof of this theorem is constructive. The argument resembles the
argument for a Bertrand competition with capacity constraints. If one family
invests more than the other, that family's child will match with the wealthi-
est child on the other side of the market. In the mixed strategy equilibrium
investments generate random returns since the investment level of the com-
peting family is random. We choose the supports and distributions for the
mixed strategies so that each family is indierent to every investment level in
the support of its equilibrium strategy. The major complication involved in
this argument arises from the fact that family who invests most gets a ran-
dom return equal to the rst order statistic for investment levels on the other
side of the market. The distribution of this order statistic is endogenous. So
this apparently straightforward problem requires a xed point argument to
give a complete result.
The theorem illustrates nicely the inherent unpredictability of investment.
Both kinds of families choose their bilateral Nash investment level with pos-
itive probability. However, they also use a strategy that involves investment
at a level strictly above w
h with positive probability. It follows immediately
that both families will invest, on average, strictly more than their bilateral
Nash investment levels. From the position of the atoms, and the restriction
on densities, it is immediate that the family with the highest endowment
will invest more, on average, than the family with the low endowment. With
randomization however, there is a strictly positive probability that the poor
family will end up investing more than the wealthy family. Their child will
14then be at the top of the wealth distribution. We interpret this as endogenous
intergenerational mobility in wealth.
We have explored exact equilibria with more families, but apart from the
general existence of mixed strategy equilibria, it is dicult to provide a good
characterization of Nash equilibrium in investment. Unlike similar problems
with discontinuous payos (for example Allen and Hellwig (1986)) the payo
associated with being rst is itself endogenous. This makes it dicult to
see what restrictions on payos are required to keep the equilibrium mixed
strategies well behaved.
7 Discussion
There is also a close connection between the models in this paper and the
directed search models of the labor market (for example Shi (1999) or Moen
(1997)). To see this suppose that there is a measurable set of rms who
invest in physical capital and workers who invest in human capital. Firms
have dierent technologies parameterized by some variable y 2 R with the
marginal product of capital increasing in y. Workers dier according to a
parameter y0 that determined the cost at which the worker can acquire human
capital. This cost is assumed to be decreasing as y0 increases. Each rm has a
single job to be lled and each worker wishes to ll one job. The total output
produced by the rm is some increasing function of the physical capital w
invested by the rm and the human capital w0 invested by the worker who
lls the job. Physical capital is purchased by the rm at a xed price r
while human capital is acquired by the worker according to a convex and
increasing cost e(w0). For the moment, assume that when a rm and worker
match, each receives a xed share of the prot that is created. So if a rm
who invests physical capital w is matched with a worker with human capital
w0, the prot of the rm is
f (w;w
0;y)   rw
while the prot of the worker is




The functional form used in this example diers slightly from that used in the
marriage market above, but otherwise the problems are identical. If we allow
15the rms to advertize their capital stocks after they make their investments
so that workers can apply to the rm that they like, all the equilibria will
involve assortative matching exactly as in the marriage problem.
The hedonic value of the rms investment w is given by some function
g (w) that gives the human capital that will be embodied in the worker that
the rm expects to be able to attract. Conversely, any worker who wants
a job at a rm with physical capital w will have to provide the level g (w)
of human capital to get the job. In equilibrium, this hedonic value will en-
sure that rms and workers will invest eciently. This is similar to the
result in Moen (1997), though it generalizes that result by allowing rms
and workers to dier, and by endogenizing the investments on both sides of
the market. There are also some important dierences. In the existing
literature on directed search in labor markets, frictions generated by workers
inability to coordinate their search decisions play an important role.5 The
hedonic value of any given wage that a rm oers to pay workers is then
measured by the size of the queue of applicants that the rm attracts. The
model here shows that when families or workers dier in equilibrium, the
mixed strategy equilibria that support these frictions disappear - the match-
ing equilibria that occur after wages are posted or capital stocks are chosen
involve pure assortative matching - families use their own characteristics to
coordinate their search decisions. Despite this, the hedonic interpretation in
which the market responds to specic investments with a predictable return
is supported.
The other major dierence is that there are no side payments in the model
studied here (in the labor market interpretation, rms do not oer wages but
instead simply give workers an exogenously determined split of the prot).
The case where workers and rms have multidimensional characteristics is
certainly likely to support a hedonic interpretation, but so far models of this
form have not been studied.
One of the predictions of the model studied here is certainly too strong -
pure assortative matching. Clearly the model needs to be extended to allow
for unobservable or match specic characteristics. The payo to focussing
on the case with perfect information is the simplicity of the model that it
delivers. A synthesis of the directed search models of the kind discussed
here and the random matching models that characterize the older literature
5Frictions are generated by the fact that workers use mixed strategies when they choose
which rms to apply to Shi (1999), or Peters (1999).
16is clearly an important topic for future research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Theorem 3:
Restrict attention for the moment to families in M. The proof is constructive.
Let w and w be the ex post expected level of investment of the poorest and
wealthiest child in F. Let Hw and Hl denote the probability mixtures used by
the wealthy and rich families in M respectively and suppose that these satisfy
the hypothesis of the theorem. In other words, Hl and Hh have atoms at w
l
and w
h respectively, and are otherwise smooth on some interval [w
h;w].
Consider the wealthy family rst. If it turns out that it's child has the
highest investment level ex post, then he will match with the wealthiest child
in F who will have expected investment w. If he is poorest ex post, he will
match with the poorest child in F, gaining a partner whose expected wealth
is w. The only tie we need to worry about occurs when the poor family
invests exactly w
h and this is matched by the rich family. In this case we
assume that the wealthy child from F proposes to the male from the poor
family for sure.6 Under these conditions, the expected payo when the family








+ (1   Hl (w))






To support the equilibrium this must be constant along [w
h;w] and equal
to




h + (1   Hl (w
h))w + Hl (w
h)w
z
to induce the wealthy family in M to make the investment. If the function
is constant, it's derivative should be almost everywhere 0, or
 V









6This is for notational convenience only - our results are unaected by the tie breaking
rule. If the rich child from F randomizes in some fashion, the payo to playing w
h exactly
will still be smaller than the limit of the payos associated with playing slightly more than
w









The function Hl is then determined (up to a constant) by integrating














V (yh   w








h) is the probability with which the low wealth family invests w
l .
This atom, and the value of w are determined below.
The poor family faces a similar problem. Let Hh be the distribution of
investments by the wealthy family. The poor family's payo is
Hh (w)





+ (1   Hh (w))





and this should be constant on the interval [w

























h) is the probability with which the wealthy family invests w
h.
The poor family will choose the investment level w
l on the equilibrium
path, so the atom in Hh (w
h) should be chosen to make the poor family
indierent between the investment levels w
l and w
h conditional on the as-
sumption that if the poor family invests w
h it will match with the rich family
on the other side of the market in the event of ties. To accomplish this,















































Then reasoning as above, we have that
Hh (w) = Hh (w

h) +
V (yl   w







V (yl   w







Finally, there can be no atoms at the top of the distribution of investments
because of the discontinuous increase in expected wealth that this creates.
So the atom at Hl (w
h) (i.e., the probability that the poor family chooses
investment w
l ) should be chosen so that the top of the supports of Hl and
Hh coincide. The top of the support of Hh is given by the solution to
V (yl   w










h) = 1  
V (yh   w







Note that since the density of the distribution Hh is uniformly higher on
the interval [w
h;w] than the density of Hl, it follows that the atom H
l (w
h)
is strictly larger than the atom Hh (w
l ) which veries the two properties of
the distributions mentioned in the theorem. One implication of this is that
the mean investment of the wealthy family exceeds the mean investment of
the poor family.
Conditional on the mean payo levels, w and w it is straightforward to
show that neither family can protably deviate from this strategy. The poor
family is indierent between investing w
l and any investment level in the
support [w
h;w] by construction. Investment levels between w
l and w
h
guarantee a match with a partner whose expected wealth is w. Since this
19outcome is the same for every investment level on the interval [w
l ;w
h) the
poor family's expected utility is strictly higher when they invest w
l than
it is when they invest any amount in (w
l ;w
h) by the strict concavity of
V . Similarly, the quality of the poor family's match is independent of it's
investment level if it tries to invest more.
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